

- there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” In a separate vote, that paragraph was approved by a vote of 168 to three (United States, Russia, Israel) with five abstentions (including France and Britain).
- 5 A/RES/55/33C, para. 18. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 154 in support (including China, Britain, United States) to three opposed (India, Israel, Pakistan) with eight abstentions (including France and Russia).
 - 6 See “Verification of nuclear disarmament: final report on studies into the verification of nuclear warheads and their components,” working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.1, and previous working papers cited therein. Online at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/wp/verification_UK.pdf.
 - 7 Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, *Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities*, 2005. Online at <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11265.html>.
 - 8 *Id.* pp. 219-220.
 - 9 International Panel on Fissile Materials, *Global Fissile Material Report 2006*, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 2006, pp. 51-56.
 - 10 *Program Statement*, Global Action to Prevent War, New York, 2003, p.13. Online at <http://globalactionpw.org/prev/GlobalAction403.pdf>.
 - 11 *Weapons of Terror*, p. 183.
 - 12 Stephen G. Rademaker, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, “U.S. Compliance With Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),” Remarks at a Panel Discussion of the Arms Control Association, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., February 3, 2005. Online at http://armscontrol.org/events/20050203_rademaker_text.asp. For rebuttal of this claim, see section 1.2. See also “Compliance Assessment: The NPT Declared Nuclear Weapon States,” Part Three, Civil Society Presentation to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy and Western States Legal Foundation, May 2005. Online at <http://lcnp.org/disarmament/npt/ArtVIcompliance.pdf>.

Section 4.1: The Word as Arrow

- 1 Václav Havel, “A Word About Words,” Acceptance Speech for the Peace Prize of the German Booksellers Association, Oct. 15, 1989. Online at <http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/index.php?sec=2&id=1&setln=2>.
- 2 For details, consult the Natural Resource Defense Council’s Archive of Nuclear Data at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp>, and Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “U.S. nuclear forces, 2007,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2007, pp. 79-82.
- 3 See M.V. Ramana, “Bombing Bombay? Effects of Nuclear Weapons and a Case Study of a Hypothetical Explosion,” *IPPNW Global Health Watch*, No. 3, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999.
- 4 See *section 1.2*. The Court unanimously concluded that: “There exists an

- obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” (Nuclear Weapons Opinion, para. 105(2)F)
- 5 McGraw-Hill, 1965. For a discussion of the term “sufficiency” in this context, see Edward Morgan’s letter to the New York Review of Books, June 5, 1969. Online at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/11296>.
 - 6 Cf. Walter Dorn, “Human Security: An Overview.” Online at http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn24_e.html. *See also* The Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice in the 21st Century. online at <http://haguepeace.org/resources/HagueAgendaPeace+Justice4The21stCentury.pdf>.
 - 7 See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thule>.

Section 4.2: A Gender Perspective

- 1 Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill, and Sara Ruddick, “The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission*, published study No. 38, Stockholm, December 2005 (“Cohn”).
- 2 *Weapons of Terror*, pp. 18, 43-44.
- 3 *Id.* p. 87.
- 4 *Cohn*, p. 3.
- 5 *Weapons of Terror*, p. 35. Here, the Commission actually says states might seek WMD, not nuclear weapons, to enhance their status, but it later says possessing biological weapons “would not enhance the status of any state.” *Id.*, p. 40. As chemical weapons are outlawed like biological weapons, presumably the WMD to which the Commission is referring are nuclear weapons.

Section 4.3: Redefining Security in Human Terms

- 1 *Weapons of Terror*, p. 24.
- 2 *Id.*, p. 161 (emphasis supplied).
- 3 *Id.*, p. 160 (emphasis supplied).
- 4 *Id.* (emphasis supplied).
- 5 Don Oberdorfer, “Strategy for Solo Superpower; Pentagon Looks to ‘Regional Contingencies,’” *The Washington Post*, May 19, 1991. Online (for purchase) at <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-1065534.html>.
- 6 See <http://www.abolition2000.org>.
- 7 *Weapons of Terror*, p. 109.
- 8 See section 2.2.
- 9 See <http://www.unitedforpeace.org>.
- 10 See <http://www.mayorsforpeace.org>.
- 11 *Call From Social Movements For Mobilizations Against The War, Neoliberalism, Exploitation And Exclusion Another World Is Possible*, World Social Forum, Porto Alegre Brazil, January 2005. Online at http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/dinamic.php?pagina=decl_mov_soc_2005_in.
- 12 *Weapons of Terror*, p. 109.
- 13 *Weapons of Terror* does note in its final section, on p. 183, “The perspective of a world free of WMD must be supplemented by the perspective of a world in which the arsenals of conventional weapons have been reduced drastically.”