
PART IV

CIVIL SOCIETY AND CHANGE

The Word as Arrow

PETER WEISS

In truth, the power of words is neither unambiguous nor clear-cut... Words that electrify society with their freedom and truthfulness are matched by words that mesmerize, deceive, inflame, madden; words that are harmful, lethal even. The word as arrow.

Václav Havel¹

One might add to Václav Havel's truism that the more dangerous a subject is, the more circumscribed it is likely to be by words that mesmerize and deceive. Take *non-proliferation*, for instance, and do a simple test. The next time a friend or acquaintance asks, "What are you working on these days?", say "Getting rid of nuclear weapons" and watch their reaction. Chances are it will be something like "That's good; I'm for non-proliferation also." Then explain to your interlocutor that he is on all fours with GW Bush, whose idea of non-proliferation is nuclear apartheid, i.e. "We have'em, we're going to keep'em and you're never going to get'em."

Here, then, is a short guide to the proper use of words in the nuclear context.

Disarmament. You might think this means going down to zero. But you would be wrong. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines disarmament as "1. the act or an instance of disarming. 2. the reduction or limitation of the size, equipment, armament etc. of the army, navy or air force of a country." That, indeed, is the sense in which the United States claims to be complying with its nuclear disarmament obligation: by going down from about 30,000 nuclear warheads in 1967 to about 10,000 today.² But ten thousand warheads can still cause a fair amount of damage when you consider that a medium-sized one can kill millions of people, depending on the target.³ That is why the addition of the words "in all its aspects" after "nuclear disarmament" in the International Court of Justice opinion is so important.⁴ And that's why it's important to be clear that the aim must be elimination—abolition—of every single nuclear weapon. The absurdity of a numerical nuclear arms race was first brought to the public's attention in Daniel Lang's classic *An Inquiry Into Enoughness: Of Bombs and Men and Staying Alive*.⁵

Deterrence. It is customary these days for advocates of nuclear arsenals to say that they are "only for deterrence." In other words, there is no need to worry about nuclear weapons actually being used, since their only function is to deter an enemy from using its weapons of mass destruction or engaging in other military activities calling for an overwhelming response. Those using the word in this sense point to the fact that nuclear weapons have not been

used against an enemy since Nagasaki as proof that “deterrence works.” The fallacy of this approach, which casts a benevolent hue over the term, is that its effectiveness depends on credibility: if the deterring party is not prepared to use nuclear weapons in this or that situation, deterrence cannot work. It is useful, in this connection, to recall that the original context of deterrence was MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction.

Security. This abbreviation for the more comprehensive term *national security* has become the justification for the abrogation of any number of long accepted legal and moral norms. We now have torture and preventive war in the name of security. And yet “security” is, for the uninitiated, another of those warm, cozy words. Who would not want to be secure? Politicians are frequently heard to say that the security of the nation, or of the American people, is their primary concern. Yet their definition of security rarely amounts to more than keeping the terrorists, or “rogue” states’ long distance weapons, away from our shores. Thanks largely to Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s former foreign minister, a different concept of security, which goes by the name of *human security*, is contesting this narrow view. It is a concept that transcends military boundaries and envisions a world in which security dispenses with nuclear weapons but includes social, economic, environmental, and human rights dimensions (*see section 4.3*).⁶ It is increasingly recognized as well that human security requires a commitment to the absolutely essential role that women must play in bringing about a just and secure world (*see section 4.2*).

Ultimate. Another favorite verbal trick practiced by spokespersons for nuclear weapon states is protesting that they are for the “ultimate” elimination of such weapons. This is supposed to take the wind out of the sails of nuclear abolitionists and make it appear that everyone, pro and con nukes, is on the same page. Another look at the dictionary will expose the hypocrisy of this tactic. The first of seven definitions in the Random House Dictionary of the English Language reads, “last; furthest or farthest; ending a process or series” and the synonyms given are “extreme, remotest, uttermost.” In other words, the bargain struck between the nuclear weapon states and the rest of the world in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is reduced to a nullity. The elimination of nuclear weapons, to be negotiated in good faith, is put off to the uttermost point in time, perhaps to coincide with the last judgment. Note also that *Ultima Thule* in medieval geographies denotes any distant place located beyond the “borders of the known world.”⁷

Let these examples suffice as a call to attention to the tyranny of words. Perhaps they may be of some use in the ongoing dialogue between civil society and the nuclear warriors concerning the fate of the earth.

Recommendation for Society and Change

- Civil society should reframe the language used regarding nuclear instruments of mass destruction as follows: refer to their “elimination”

or “abolition” instead of using the term “nuclear disarmament,” and redefine the term “nuclear disarmament” to mean “elimination”; eschew use of the term “ultimate” regarding when this elimination will be achieved; and abandon use of the term “deterrence” in describing policies contemplating use of nuclear weapons.

A Gender Perspective

JENNIFER NORDSTROM AND FELICITY HILL

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WMD COMMISSION

In particular, women's organizations have often played a vital role—from the Hague peace conferences of the 19th century to the present time. The role of women in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security was recognized by the Security Council in Resolution 1325 (2000). Women have rightly observed that armament policies and the use of armed force have often been influenced by misguided ideas about masculinity and strength. An understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to remove some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and nonproliferation. (*Weapons of Terror*, 160)

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) challenged the WMD Commission to acknowledge the relevance of gender to the science and politics of weapons of terror. In a presentation to the Commission's meeting in Stockholm in June 2004, WILPF members Dr. Carol Cohn and Felicity Hill explained how gender stereotypes affect the ways in which WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, are culturally associated with strength, power, and masculinity. They further argued that policy debate—the way diplomats and governmental officials interact, behave, and negotiate—is limited and distorted by these gender stereotypical ways of thinking, which have been normalized and legitimized after decades of practice. Cohn, Hill, and Sara Ruddick subsequently prepared a background paper for the Commission.¹

The Commission responded by recognizing that, indeed, misguided ideas about masculinity and strength *are* an obstacle to disarmament. This is a fairly novel acknowledgment in discussions of NBC weapons, where gender qualities and related values are frequently unstated and unnoticed while they powerfully affect and direct actions and decision-making. Gender has been recognized as relevant in other peace and security areas, including in small arms deliberations and Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. Security Council Resolution 1325 is a watershed political framework which recognizes that men and women experience wars differently. It requires these differences be taken into account and recognizes that women's full and equal participation in all aspects and stages of peace processes is essential to building sustainable peace. The NBC weapons arena,

however, has been slower to acknowledge gender's influence. In contrast, the prominent role of women in raising the call for disarmament is regularly recognized, and the Commission also does so.

As the Commission's brief observation suggests, gender analysis provides tools to address why NBC weapons are valued, why additional states seek them, and why leaders resort to dominance and the use of force to obtain policy objectives. With the current non-proliferation/disarmament regime in crisis and the emergence of new threats, it would be irresponsible not to use these tools to understand and improve how we think, talk, and act about weapons, war, and militarism.

The Commission clearly states that a key part of the solution to today's proliferation problem is to ensure that states do not feel they need NBC weapons.² Gender is helpful in understanding some of the motivations of states and the dynamics between them that give rise to defensive or competitive desires for the power of mass destruction. The WILPF paper demonstrated that these dynamics are often spoken of in quasi-psychological terms that draw heavily on gender stereotypes about strength, courage, and virility. The dynamics also often involve asymmetrical power and threat perceptions that are played out through gendered bullying tactics associated with hyper-masculinity and "strong arm" behavior between "good guys" and "bad guys."

A gender analysis can also help explain why nuclear weapon states insist on retaining their arsenals despite their lack of military utility and the significant risk they pose. The Commission criticizes "brandishing nuclear weapons ... in circumstances where there is no obvious military rationale," but does not conduct an in-depth investigation into the motivations for such fruitless posturing.³ Gender is a fundamental part of the symbolic meaning of weapons possession and posturing. Possessing and brandishing an extraordinarily destructive capacity is a form of dominance associated with masculine warriors (nuclear weapons possessors are sometimes referred to as the "big boys") and is more highly valued than the feminine-associated disarmament, cooperation, and diplomacy.

The WILPF paper elaborates on this gender-linked value system in which weapons possession is equated with masculinity. This value system underlies most discussions on how to deal with international conflict and weapons, sometimes obviously so. In one of the more famous examples cited in the paper, Hindu nationalist leader Balasaheb Thackeray explained India's 1998 nuclear weapon tests by saying, "we had to prove that we are not eunuchs."⁴ Here, nuclear weapons possession is directly associated with being a real man; testing them was necessary to prove that Indian men were not emasculated.

In addition to their destructive capacity, nuclear weapons evoke images of a masculine-associated technical prowess. They require highly developed technological research and a massive manufacturing infrastructure. Part of the current support in Iran for a nuclear program comes from the desire to master nuclear technology. Public pride in developing sophisticated nuclear

technology (and not being told what to do by Western powers) is partially driving the quest for the fuel-cycle, whether or not it has anything to do with weapons.

Nuclear weapons possession is also perversely associated with power and prestige in international politics. Nuclear weapons possessors are sometimes referred to as members of “the nuclear club.” The five nuclear weapon states acknowledged under the NPT are also the five permanent, veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council. The Security Council is the most powerful international body dealing with peace and security, and has a direct responsibility for disarmament under Article 26 of the UN Charter, which it has neglected entirely (*see section 1.4*). Moreover, nuclear weapon states have considerable influence in multilateral security and disarmament discussions, and have served to slow down or block nuclear disarmament negotiations for the past ten years. Reflecting this perverse association, as the WMD Commission observes, one motivation for a state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is “the belief that this would enhance its prestige or standing.”⁵

The association of weapons with masculinity, power, prestige, and technical prowess has a direct effect on policy decisions and negotiations. Further, decision-makers and negotiators work within an overall “realist” context of power optimization, a paradigm which is also gendered. In a “realist” perspective on international relations, all states seek as much power and potential to dominate as possible. This is especially true in the nuclear age, where many western states and others have come to believe that security requires the ability to militarily dominate and control. Within this security paradigm, weapons are necessary because security can only come through the ability to obliterate the other, and to command control of any relationship through the threat or use of force. In personal interactions, this sort of fearful controlling is called abuse, but from a realist geopolitical perspective, it is called “hard security” and wise policy. By this logic, domination is simply self-defense and is therefore morally justified.

The idea of “dominate or be dominated” justifies policies of forcibly disarming other nations while simultaneously developing new weapons systems. Within this framework, disarmament is viewed as only desirable for the other, creating dichotomies where the “good guys” should be allowed all the weapons in the world while the “bad guys” get none. This is entirely unsustainable and will continue to create arms races, proliferation, confrontation, and brinkmanship leading to increasingly dangerous, destructive, and toxic conflicts.

As long as the logic prevails that nuclear weapons possession brings power, prestige, and the ultimate ability to destroy, policy makers and negotiators will attempt to retain or pursue these weapons, despite their illegality, military uselessness, and genocidal nature. Gender analysis illustrates that our culture absurdly and dangerously has come to value the attainment of destructive power as the highest goal and order of politics.

There is another option: negotiation to eliminate the dangerous threat posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons within an international system

based on cooperation. Indeed, the first resolution of the UN General Assembly recognized nuclear disarmament as a precondition for the successful evolution of multilateralism. The mixed record of the United Nations can be directly tied to the prioritization of resources towards weapons over international development.

When the goal of international relations is peaceful coexistence rather than weaponized power optimization, disarmament becomes feasible, desirable, and politically palatable. Building an international system based on cooperation instead of domination, on the rule of law instead of the rule of force, will facilitate the trust needed for sustained global disarmament. Trust and confidence among states is vital to maintaining security at the lowest level of armaments and military. Global nuclear abolition will not emerge through “reasonable” nuclear militarism—only the rejection of these weapons of terror will lead to the emergence of an international system of relationships free from the specter and “credible threat” of nuclear apocalypse. We must dismantle the reasons and justifications for these horrific weapons and promote a paradigm of international relations that does not rely on them. It will not work to change some practices while simultaneously validating a system that creates the desire for such destructive and dominating technology. It is like celebrating cutting the funds for one weapons system while increasing the military budget and upgrading the overall arsenal.

Associations between nuclear weapons possession and powerful masculinity are getting in the way of disarmament, diplomacy, and cooperative security. We need a gender perspective to dismantle the current arguments in favor of nuclear weapons possession, domination, and militarism. We must use the same tools to create the arguments for abolishing nuclear weapons and for promoting an international order based on cooperation and disarmament. Gender stereotypes that promote the value of weapons of terror are a problem at the heart of international relations and national security policies, obstructing progress towards the goal of the majority of states and citizens: the total elimination of the world’s nuclear arsenals.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

- The United States should pursue security through a cooperative, rule-based international order, with emphasis on the achievement of human security over militarized national security. In doing so, it should evaluate existing security policies and practices to identify and eliminate the influence of misguided associations between masculinity and weapons, and masculinity and the threat or use of force.
- The United States should support the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

Redefining Security in Human Terms

JACQUELINE CABASSO

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WMD COMMISSION

Everyone must contribute. WMD constitute challenges not just for governments and international organizations. Research communities, nongovernmental organizations, civil society, businesses, the media and the general public share ownership of the WMD challenges. They must all be allowed and encouraged to contribute to solutions. The report looks to them to discuss, to review and ultimately to promote its recommendations. (*Weapons of Terror*, 29)

[T]he Commission strongly supports the position – often overlooked in discussions on arms control and disarmament – that *the first barrier to WMD is a political one*. It is the development and maintenance of regional threats and responses and global peaceful relations. *Promoting peace is the prime means of avoiding both the acquisition and the retention of WMD (as well as other weapons)*. Needless to say, *progress in arms control and disarmament will often help to promote peaceful relations*. Action against terrorism is similarly in vital need of a political, social dimension in addition to intelligence, policing and military action, which is indispensable as a preventive tool. (*Weapons of Terror*, 43-44)

The Commission hopes that its report will inspire NGOs all over the world to renew their demands for transparency, free debate on WMD and the eventual elimination of all related threats. (*Weapons of Terror*, 160)

Recommendation 30: All states possessing nuclear weapons should commence planning for security without nuclear weapons. They should start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint practical and incremental measures that include definitions, benchmarks and transparency requirements for nuclear disarmament.

Recommendation 52: States should assist Non-Governmental Organizations to actively participate in international meetings

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and conferences, and to inform and campaign in the weapons of mass destruction field. Private foundations should substantially increase their support for such organizations that are working to eliminate global weapons of mass destruction threats.

The WMD Commission states what appears to be obvious: “Many people thought that the end of the Cold War would make global agreements on disarmament easier to conclude and implement. Many also expected that public opinion would push for this.” But, it goes on to acknowledge, “*The opposite has been the case,*”¹ offering at least a partial explanation:

[M]anifestations of public concern about WMD have varied widely over both time and place, as a function of access to information and the public’s own attitudes and priorities. In the Euro-Atlantic region, while general levels of concern about WMD remain high, especially with regard to terrorist threats, this concern has not inspired a new wave of political demands for nuclear disarmament. This is likely due to the decline in public fears of the risk of strategic nuclear attacks in the Post-Cold War era. Yet interest in disarmament is still strong in locations where such weapons have been *used*, as illustrated by the network of mayors addressing nuclear threats.

*The shifting both of actual threats and of fashions in thinking about them has repeatedly re-directed attention—towards safety risks from the civil rather than military use of the nuclear sector; towards risks of WMD proliferation rather than possession; towards the threat from terrorists rather than states; towards low-tech weapons like landmines and small arms rather than hi-tech ones; and away from armaments-related issues altogether. Against this background it is easy to see why WMD disarmament continues to remain low on many people’s list of priorities, both inside and outside of government.*²

The Commission recognizes the vitally important role that NGOs have played in restraining NBC weapons proliferation, and identifies in general some of the obstacles they face:

*The activities of non-governmental organizations have been the main channel for conveying views and proposals about WMD from the grass roots to governments and international organizations. They have at times exercised a tangible influence on official decisions in the direction of eliminating WMD, while also preventing new acquisitions, technical development, and additional deployments and testing.*³

Obstacles that are beyond the control of NGOs include the reluctance of some governments to permit them to pursue anti-WMD campaigns (normally on grounds of national security); the reluctance of other governments and institutions to listen to and be influenced by them; the lack of reliable and comparable data on the problem; and the lack of financial support.⁴

The question of what happened to the anti-nuclear movement merits further investigation. Today, nuclear weapons are *gaining* legitimacy, as the world's only remaining superpower blurs the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and expands the role of nuclear weapons in its "national security" policy. With the risk of use of nuclear weapons climbing towards levels not reached since the darkest days of the Cold War, where is the public outcry? What happened to the massive anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s? Why has the anti-war movement been so quiet about nuclear weapons?

When the Cold War abruptly ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, anti-nuclear activists and ordinary people everywhere collectively breathed a huge sigh of relief, hoping and believing that they had walked away from a nuclear holocaust, and putting nuclear weapons out of their minds. Many activists went on to different issues, while others went back to their day-to-day lives, raising families and working to make a living in an increasingly demanding economy. Meanwhile, deeply embedded in the military-industrial-(academic) complex, the nuclear juggernaut rolled on, as militarists in the Pentagon and scientists at the nuclear weapons labs conjured up new justifications to project the nuclear weapons enterprise into the future. In 1991, following the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, Colin Powell, then-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained, "You've got to step aside from the context we've been using for the past 40 years, that you base {military planning} against a specific threat. We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to plan for. What we plan for is that we're a superpower. We are the major player on the world stage with responsibilities around the world, with interests around the world."⁵ To implement this new strategy, "non-proliferation"—stopping the spread of nuclear weapons—was turned on its head. The new buzzword was "counterproliferation"—including the threat of a nuclear strike to dissuade other countries from developing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons that could be used to threaten the United States or its allies (*see section 2.2*).

During the 1990s, nuclear weapons—especially U.S. nuclear weapons—disappeared from the public's radar screen. Questions of nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament became increasingly isolated from issues of concern to most ordinary people—including issues of war and peace—and increasingly relegated to elite policy circles inside the Washington, DC beltway. This trend was exacerbated when several national organizations that had worked for nuclear arms control and disarmament in the 1980s moved

their headquarters into DC, some even closing their field offices. Professional “experts” redefined post-Cold War nuclear priorities almost solely in terms of securing Russian “loose nukes” and keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of “rogue” states and terrorists.

Meanwhile, independent grassroots groups monitoring local nuclear weapons facilities were documenting U.S. plans to replace underground nuclear tests with a new generation of high-tech experimental laboratory facilities and supercomputers, and challenging proposals for new weapons production processes and capabilities. For the most part, that information was kept out of Washington discourse by arms control lobbyists in DC, who were focused almost exclusively on securing ratification of the CTBT—at any price—while protecting their access to policy and decision makers. Apparently, from their point of view, it was an “inconvenient truth” that nuclear weapons research and development was going forward hand in hand with evolving counterproliferation policies reliant on “credible” U.S. nuclear threats.

To make matters worse, as the decade wore on, funding for NGOs working for both arms control and disarmament began to dry up. Those funders still in the field increasingly withdrew support for independent local and regional groups advocating for the abolition of, rather than U.S. control of, nuclear weapons in a broader context. Instead they encouraged an increasingly centralized, narrowly framed, “top down” approach, comprised mainly of legislative initiatives targeting individual new nuclear weapons programs. Those programs were addressed, for the most part, in isolation, without reference to existing nuclear weapons or any broader military or foreign policy considerations.

Largely unchallenged by the arms control community, and oblivious to calls for disarmament from outside the beltway, the Clinton administration squandered the historically unprecedented period of opportunity that appeared with the end of the Cold War (*see section 2.3*). Indeed, the Clinton administration laid the groundwork for the Bush administration’s unilateral and aggressive foreign policy, in which the potential use of nuclear weapons is now openly considered.

Thwarted in the national arena, disarmament groups in the United States gravitated towards international forums. At the month-long 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference at United Nations headquarters in New York, they found that the U.S. government, with the support of a consortium of well-funded American arms control groups, was demanding indefinite, unconditional extension of the treaty, while barely acknowledging its disarmament requirements.

Tensions were high during the Review and Extension Conference, as many non-nuclear weapon states expressed their dissatisfaction with the lack of meaningful progress towards disarmament by the nuclear weapon states. Stressing the mutually reinforcing nature of the disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, non-nuclear weapon states warned that an

international system of nuclear apartheid was not sustainable. Frustrated and dismayed that the arms control groups were avoiding the “D” word—“disarmament”—dozens of NGOs from around the world drafted and ratified a comprehensive nuclear disarmament platform calling for “*definite and conditional*” extension of the NPT and immediate commencement of negotiations on a verifiable treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, with the treaty to be completed by the year 2000. By the end of the conference, hundreds of groups had signed the “Abolition 2000 Statement,” and the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons was born. Although the network didn’t meet its original target date for completion of a treaty, today more than 2000 groups in over 90 countries are associated with Abolition 2000, and the founding statement remains as relevant as ever (*see box*).⁶ Unfortunately, the funding community has marginalized Abolition 2000, even though it is the largest network of nuclear disarmament advocacy groups in the world. Most funders do not seem to share the WMD Commission’s view that a “*key challenge is to dispel the perception that outlawing nuclear weapons is a utopian goal*,”⁷ and therefore they do not see the value of a supporting a robust, decentralized, global civil society movement to help dispel that perception by fostering the development of human will.

Abolition 2000 Statement

A secure and livable world for our children and grandchildren and all future generations requires that we achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and redress the environmental degradation and human suffering that is the legacy of fifty years of nuclear weapons testing and production.

Further, the inextricable link between the “peaceful” and warlike uses of nuclear technologies and the threat to future generations inherent in creation and use of long-lived radioactive materials must be recognized. We must move toward reliance on clean, safe, renewable forms of energy production that do not provide the materials for weapons of mass destruction and do not poison the environment for thousands of centuries. The true “inalienable” right is not to nuclear energy, but to life, liberty and security of person in a world free of nuclear weapons.

We recognize that a nuclear weapons free world must be achieved carefully and in a step by step manner. We are convinced of its technological feasibility. Lack of political will, especially on the part of the nuclear weapons states, is the only true barrier. As chemical and biological weapons are prohibited, so must nuclear weapons be prohibited.

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We call upon all states particularly the nuclear weapons states, declared and de facto to take the following steps to achieve nuclear weapons abolition. We further urge the states parties to the NPT to demand binding commitments by the declared nuclear weapons states to implement these measures:

1. Initiate immediately and conclude* negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.**
2. Immediately make an unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.
3. Rapidly complete a truly comprehensive test ban treaty with a zero threshold and with the stated purpose of precluding nuclear weapons development by all states.
4. Cease to produce and deploy new and additional nuclear weapons systems, and commence to withdraw and disable deployed nuclear weapons systems.
5. Prohibit the military and commercial production and reprocessing of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.
6. Subject all weapons-usable radioactive materials and nuclear facilities in all states to international accounting, monitoring, and safeguards, and establish a public international registry of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.
7. Prohibit nuclear weapons research, design, development, and testing through laboratory experiments including but not limited to non-nuclear hydrodynamic explosions and computer simulations, subject all nuclear weapons laboratories to international monitoring, and close all nuclear test sites.
8. Create additional nuclear weapons free zones such as those established by the treaties of Tlatelolco and Raratonga.
9. Recognize and declare the illegality of threat or use of nuclear weapons, publicly and before the World Court.
10. Establish an international energy agency to promote and support the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources.
11. Create mechanisms to ensure the participation of citizens and NGOs in planning and monitoring the process of nuclear weapons abolition.

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A world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration of humanity. This goal cannot be achieved in a non-proliferation regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states. Our common security requires the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our objective is definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons.

* The 1995 Abolition 2000 Statement called for the conclusion of negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention “by the year 2000.” Recognizing that the nuclear weapons states would likely fail in their obligations to conclude such negotiations, this phrase was removed at the end of the year 2000 after member organizations voted and agreed upon its removal.

** The convention should mandate irreversible disarmament measures, including but not limited to the following: withdraw and disable all deployed nuclear weapons systems; disable and dismantle warheads; place warheads and weapon-usable radioactive materials under international safeguards; destroy ballistic missiles and other delivery systems. The convention could also incorporate the measures listed above which should be implemented independently without delay. When fully implemented, the convention would replace the NPT.

Reclaiming Nuclear Disarmament as a Peace and Justice Issue

In the run up to the spring 2003 U.S. attack on Iraq, premised in part on the wholly unsubstantiated claim that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program, a new American anti-war movement began to coalesce, with a heightened sensitivity to the domestic impacts of the “war on terror,” including violations of immigrants’ rights, and drastic cuts to social services for the poor and working classes. The first National Assembly of United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ), in June 2003, presented an opportunity for nuclear abolitionists to reclaim nuclear disarmament as a peace and justice issue, and to reintegrate it into the broader anti-war agenda. A proposal from U.S. Abolition 2000 groups to make nuclear disarmament a UFPJ priority was adopted, with little discussion or controversy. It was striking, however, that several NGO delegates voiced objections to the effect that “nuclear disarmament is the *Bush* agenda!”

Those individuals were apparently referring to the Bush administration’s preventive war doctrine, carried out against Iraq and threatened against Iran and North Korea. They seemed to be unaware that the United States maintains

a 10,000 warhead nuclear arsenal, with some 1,600 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. Prior to the U.S. attack on Iraq Bush had told the American public, “We cannot wait for the final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” They probably didn’t know (few did) that the United States had drawn up contingency plans for using its own nuclear weapons in Iraq;⁸ or that the United States is spending well over \$6 billion a year to maintain and upgrade its nuclear warheads and many billions more to modernize their means of delivery. Their response exposed what turned out to be a vast lack of awareness in the new anti-war movement—reflecting a greatly diminished level of public awareness—about the central role of nuclear weapons in current U.S. “national security” policy. And it marked the beginning of an ongoing internal education process within UFPJ, with over 1,300 local and national member groups, the largest anti-war coalition in the United States.⁹

In August 2004, on the 59th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of their cities, the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, urged on by the aging “Hibakusha” (survivors), launched the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons. Revisiting the Abolition 2000 agenda, they presented their “2020 Vision,” a timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020, which they would bring as a demand to the NPT five-year Review Conference in May 2005.¹⁰

By the time they arrived in New York City, more than 500 Mayors from 32 countries—65 of them from the United States—had signed onto the Mayors’ campaign statement. On May 1, the day before the 2005 NPT Review Conference began in New York, Abolition 2000 and United for Peace and Justice joined forces as 40,000 people marched past United Nations headquarters and rallied in Central Park. The Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and dozens of Hibakusha carried the lead banner, which read: “*NO NUKES! NO WARS! End the War in Iraq. Abolish All Nuclear Weapons.*” They were flanked by city officials and NGO leaders from around the world. Behind them, spirited anti-nuclear and anti-war activists filled more than 13 city blocks.

A few months earlier, a handful of representatives from Abolition 2000 and UFPJ had persuaded the Global Anti-War Assembly at the World Social Forum in Brazil to incorporate a call for the abolition of nuclear weapons into its Final Declaration, and to endorse the May 1st demonstration for a nuclear weapon free world. This marked a new phase for the World Social Forum, in which anti-nuclearism and anti-militarism began to be articulated as important elements of corporate anti-globalization efforts.¹¹

With nuclear crises looming in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and in South Asia, the issue of nuclear weapons has been delivered back to the anti-war movement. Its challenge and its promise now is to grow from an anti-Iraq war movement into a mature *peace and justice* movement, a movement which demands in no uncertain terms the elimination of nuclear weapons within the framework of a new concept of *global* (not “national”)

security based on human needs and ecological values, and not on the threat of horrific annihilation.

Moorea Declaration

Adopted at the Abolition 2000 Conference, Moorea,
Te Ao Maohi (French Occupied Polynesia), 25 January 1997

This conference reaffirms the commitments and the vision of the Abolition 2000 Founding Statement initiated in 1995—the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombing of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—to work for the definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons, and redress the environmental degradation and human suffering that is the legacy of fifty two years of nuclear weapons usage, testing, and production.

However, this meeting, held in Te Ao Maohi a year after the end of French nuclear testing, has highlighted the particular suffering of indigenous and colonised peoples as a result of the production and testing of nuclear weapons. The anger and tears of colonised peoples arise from the fact that there was no consultation, no consent, no involvement in the decision when their lands, air and waters were taken for the nuclear build-up, from the very start of the nuclear era.

Colonised and indigenous peoples have, in the large part, borne the brunt of this nuclear devastation—from the mining of uranium and the testing of nuclear weapons on indigenous peoples land, to the dumping, storage and transport of plutonium and nuclear wastes, and the theft of land for nuclear infrastructure.

The founding statement of Abolition 2000 states that “the participation of citizens and NGO’s in planning and monitoring the abolition of nuclear weapons is vital.” We reaffirm this, in spirit and action, but also state that indigenous and colonised peoples must be central to this process. This can only happen if and when they are able to participate in decisions relating to the nuclear weapons cycle—and especially in the abolition of nuclear weapons in all aspects. The inalienable right to self-determination, sovereignty and independence is crucial in allowing all peoples of the world to join in the common struggle to rid the planet forever of nuclear weapons.

Therefore this conference agrees that this Moorea Declaration becomes a supplement to the Abolition 2000 Founding Statement.

Redefining Security

The WMD Commission recommends, “All states possessing nuclear weapons should commence planning for security without nuclear weapons.” But, while advocating, “preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint practical and incremental measures...”¹² it does not directly address what “security without nuclear weapons” means, leaving this fundamentally important question open to a wide variety of interpretations.¹³

One rather disquieting view of security without nuclear weapons was recently offered by Robert Einhorn, a Clinton administration nuclear policy expert and arms control advocate. “We should be putting far more effort into developing more effective conventional weapons,” he said. “*It’s hard to imagine a president using nuclear weapons under almost any circumstance, but no one doubts our willingness to use conventional weapons.*”¹⁴ This statement, unfortunately, is all too true. But an even more overpowering conventional U.S. military threat surely is not the desired outcome of the nuclear disarmament process. Moreover, how practical would that approach be? How would countries with fewer economic resources—especially those on the “enemies” list—respond? Wouldn’t they have an incentive to maintain or acquire nuclear weapons to counter overwhelming U.S. conventional military superiority? And wouldn’t that, in turn, even further entrench U.S. determination to retain and modernize its own nuclear arsenal, thus rendering the goal of nuclear disarmament nearly impossible? (*See section 2.4.*)

Earlier in its report, the WMD Commission noted the disparity between nuclear disarmament and development efforts. Recalling that the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a *single* recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation in September 2005, the Commission wrote:

It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. *Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world’s most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive.*¹⁵

But, what it will take to “move the gearshift?” Governments of non-nuclear weapon states routinely pay lip service to this subject. Though he didn’t mention nuclear weapons by name, Brazilian President Lula da Silva, in his statement commencing the General Debate of the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, summed it up this way: “There will only be security in a world where all have the right to economic and social development. *The true path to peace is shared development. If we do not want war to go global, justice must go global.*”¹⁶

Dr. Oscar Arias Sánchez, President of Costa Rica and winner of the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize, in his speech to the General Assembly, proposed an agenda for action to improve the “well being of all people.” Noting, “our [Central American] countries have ceased to be pawns in the global chess game of the Cold War,” he declared:

[I]f we are going to turn development and human rights into something more than the utopia that they are today for hundreds of millions of people in the world, it will take more than good intentions. *We must summon the courage to recognize things for what they truly are, to rectify mistakes and to make decisions that cannot be postponed.... First, we must denounce military spending, the arms race and the arms trade as offensive to the human condition.*¹⁷

As a starting point, we need to critically analyze the practical security requirements of ordinary people, wherever they live, in order to develop a new commonly shared understanding of security, defined in human and ecological terms. That understanding can help people begin to realize that their own security is tied more closely to the security of other people around the world than to the security of any national government and its elites. As a next step, hopefully it will move them to action, educating others and pressing their own governments to change their policies. One of the reasons the American public has been so slow to challenge U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, and indeed, the current administration’s entire “war on terror” concept, is because the idea that their “national security” is dependent on unbridled military might is repeated on a daily basis by high-ranking government officials, reinforced ad nauseum and unquestioned in the mainstream media.

In her 1976 book, *The Game of Disarmament*, Alva Myrdal, a Swedish minister of disarmament and winner of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize asked:

How can we let the nationalistic security needs as defined and exaggerated by military and other vested interests misguide our societies? How can we allow secretiveness and falsifications of reality to motivate the continued arms race, with all the dangers and burdens thereof? The common man should demand honest accountability of the policy-makers. He has the right to question their ethics.¹⁸

But at this moment in history, it seems that the common American man and woman are largely unaware of the terrible price they have already paid for nuclear weapons and the nuclear dangers that are growing again. *Atomic Audit*, a study by the Brookings Institution completed in 1998, found that the United States spent \$5.5 trillion dollars on nuclear weapons from 1940–1996 (in constant 1996 dollars). Steven Schwartz, the director of the study, stressed that this breathtaking number was a *conservative* estimate, “a

floor rather than a ceiling.” The Brookings study found that nuclear weapons spending during the 56 year period it examined exceeded the combined total federal spending for education; training, employment, and social services; agriculture; natural resources and the environment; general science, space, and technology; community and regional development, including disaster relief; law enforcement; and energy production and regulation. On average, the study estimated, the United States has spent \$98 billion a year on nuclear weapons.¹⁹

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 budget request of \$6.51 billion for nuclear weapons research, development, and testing activities is \$103.4 million more than the FY 2007 request.²⁰ Even after accounting for inflation, this is more than one-third higher than the average annual spending on nuclear weapons during the Cold War.²¹ Moreover, this figure does not include delivery systems or command and control technologies, which are funded separately through the Department of Defense. Many of the Defense Department programs are “dual-use,” meaning shared with conventional weapons systems, which complicates assessment of the total budget. Nonetheless, in late 2004, the Natural Resources Defense Council estimated, “approximately \$40 billion, or about 10 percent of the annual U.S. military budget [at that time], is spent on nuclear weapons.”²² *This is more than the entire military budget of nearly every individual country in the world.* In 2004 or 2005, only China (\$62.5 B), Russia (\$61.9B), the United Kingdom (\$51.1B), Japan (\$44.7B), and France (\$41.6B), spent more than \$40 billion in total on their militaries.²³

What else could \$40 billion a year be used for? According to the 1998 United Nations Development Program report, the additional cost of achieving and maintaining universal access to basic education for *all*, basic health care for *all*, reproductive health care for *all women*, adequate food for *all*, and clean water and safe sewers for *all* would amount to roughly \$40 billion a year.²⁴

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that world military expenditure in 2005 reached \$1,118 billion, or an average of \$173 per person:

The USA, responsible for about 80 per cent of the increase in 2005, is the principal determinant of the current world trend.... The USA is responsible for 48 per cent of the world total, distantly followed by the UK, France, Japan and China with 4-5 per cent each. The rapid increase in the USA’s military spending is to a large extent attributable to the ongoing costly military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁵

Adding the supplemental appropriations for Afghanistan and Iraq to the FY 2005 U.S. military budget, the total climbs to a staggering \$522 billion.²⁶ The Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) estimates that all

together, the United States spent \$783 billion in FY2005 for past and present military activities.²⁷ FCNL also notes that nearly 36 million Americans live in poverty, including nearly one in five children, and that the U.S. is spending more than \$20 on wars and war preparations for every \$1 spent on diplomacy, international cooperation, and humanitarian and development aid.²⁸

Analyst William Hartung of the World Policy Institute reports that proposed U.S. military spending for FY 2008 is larger than military spending by *all* of the other nations in the world combined. By his calculations, the FY 2008 military budget is over 120 times higher than the approximately \$5 billion spent annually by the U.S. government to combat global warming. And, he writes, as the poverty rate in the United States continues to climb, the FY 2008 budget proposes cuts of \$13 billion in non-military related discretionary spending to community development, Head Start, low-income energy assistance, special education, and child care and development programs.²⁹

In his speech to the UN General Assembly, Arias reflected:

Since the tragic events of the 11th of September 2001, a little more than 200 billion dollars have been added to global military spending. There is not a single indicator that suggests that this colossal increase is making the world more secure.... On the contrary, we feel more and more vulnerable and fragile. Maybe it's time to think of other ways to deploy those resources.

And he offered this poetic alternative:

Maybe it is time to realize that with much less than that sum we could guarantee access to potable water and primary education for every person in the world, and maybe there would be enough left over, as Gabriel García Márquez suggested, *para perfumar de sandalo en un día de otoño las cataratas del Niagara*—roughly translated, to perfume the waters of Niagara Falls on one autumn day. Maybe it is *time* to understand that all this is what would really make us happier and more secure.³⁰ [Emphasis in original.]

Historically, some U.S. leaders have recognized the requirements for real security. In his visionary 1941 State of the Union address, before the United States entered the second World War, President Franklin Roosevelt declared:

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.

Significantly, he did not consider this to be a utopian goal. “*That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation.*”³¹ Current U.S. foreign and domestic policies associated with the open-ended “war on terror” call into question all of those freedoms.

Kirk Boyd, executive director of the International Bill of Rights, expressed it well when he wrote: “*The false impression being drummed into Americans by today’s leadership is that there is greater security in weapons and the military than in freedom from want. The truth is we will never reach the fourth freedom, freedom from fear, if we rely on the military alone.*”³²

According to the United Nations 2005 Human Development Report, “On any assessment of threats to human life there is an extraordinary mismatch between military budgets and human need.” The Report states that for every \$1 invested in development assistance, another \$10 is spend on military budgets. “No G-7 country has a ratio of military expenditure to aid of less than 4:1. That ratio rises to 13:1 for the United Kingdom and to 25:1 for the United States.” Indeed, the United States is at the bottom of the list when it comes to Official Development Assistance (ODA).³³ The United States gives very little to help remedy the global poverty and squalor faced daily by billions of people. In terms of percentage of its Gross National Product, the United States has almost always given less to ODA than any other industrialized nation in the world, (although since 2000, its dollar amount has been the highest). In 2005, the United States ranked 21st among the 22 richest countries in the world when it comes to aid.³⁴

In addition, the United States transfers more weapons and military services than any other country in the world. As documented by the World Policy Institute, between 1992 and 2003, the United States sold \$177.5 billion in arms to foreign nations. In 2003 alone, the Pentagon and State Department delivered or licensed the delivery of \$5.7 billion in weaponry to poor debt ridden nations in the developing world. Despite its tough domestic laws regulating arms trade, almost half of those weapons went to countries plagued with ongoing conflict and governed by undemocratic regimes with poor human rights records. In 2003, \$2.7 billion in weaponry went to 13

governments deemed undemocratic by the U.S. State Department's own Human Rights Report. Another \$97.4 million worth of weapons went to governments considered by the State Department to have "poor" human rights records.³⁵

If the most powerful military force that has ever existed on the face of the earth premises its national security on the threatened first use of nuclear weapons, why shouldn't we expect *less* powerful countries to follow suit? This model is simply unsustainable. A radically new definition of security, based on profoundly different values, is needed. It is time to throw away the outdated notion of "national" security, and replace it with a new concept of "human" security.

A great American, Martin Luther King, Jr., recognized this in his "call to conscience" speech against the Vietnam War in 1967:

I am convinced that if we are to get on the right side of the world revolution, we as a nation must undergo a radical revolution of values. We must rapidly begin the shift from a thing-oriented society to a person-oriented society. When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights, are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, extreme materialism, and militarism are incapable of being conquered.

A true revolution of values will soon cause us to question the fairness and justice of many of our past and present policies...

A true revolution of values will soon look uneasily on the glaring contrast of poverty and wealth...

A true revolution of values will lay hand on the world order and say of war, '[t]his way of settling differences is not just'.... A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death.

America, the richest and most powerful nation in the world, can well lead the way in this revolution of values. There is nothing except a tragic death wish to prevent us from reordering our priorities so that the pursuit of peace will take precedence over the pursuit of war. There is nothing except a tragic death wish to keep us from molding a recalcitrant status quo with bruised hands until we have fashioned it into a brotherhood.³⁶

In 1994, Dr. Mahbub Ul Haq, head of the United Nations Development Program addressed the question, "What happened to the peace dividend?" in a public forum held at the United Nations. Dr. Ul Haq spoke eloquently of the need for a fundamental transformation in the concept of security, which he described as: "the security of people, not just of territory; the security of individuals, not just of nations; security through development, not through arms; security of all the people everywhere—in their homes, in

their jobs, in their streets, in their communities and in their environment.” This new interpretation, he explained, requires us to regard human security as “universal, global and indivisible.” In other words, it applies equally to all people everywhere.³⁷

That kind of security cannot be brought about through nuclear weapons and military might. That kind of security can only be ensured through the equitable distribution of adequate food, shelter, clean water and air, health care, education, and even the arts. And, somewhat paradoxically, if funding was shifted from armaments to fulfilling these basic human needs, some of the root causes of violence—namely poverty and injustice—would at the same time be addressed, thus reducing the “need” or excuse for military action or other expressions of violence. This alternative way to think about their security, outside the conventional national security “box,” offers Americans—and others—an opportunity to see hope for the future through their global interdependence.

The Role of NGOs and Civil Society

How might this alternative way of thinking about security be applied? Shortly after the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Mahatma Gandhi said:

It has been suggested by American friends that the atom bomb will bring in Ahimsa [Non-violence] as nothing else can. It will, if it is meant that its destructive power will so disgust the world that it will turn away from violence for the time being. This is very like a man glutting himself with dainties [sweets] to the point of nausea and turning away from them, only to return with redoubled zeal after the affect of the nausea is well over. Precisely in the same manner will the world return to violence with renewed zeal after the effect of the disgust is worn out.

So far as I can see, the atomic bomb has deadened the finest feeling that has sustained mankind for ages.... The atom bomb brought an empty victory to the allied armies but it resulted for the time being in destroying the soul of Japan. What has happened to the soul of the destroying nation is yet too early to see....

Now we’re seeing—only too clearly. As Gandhi observed:

The moral to be legitimately drawn from the supreme tragedy of the bomb is that it will not be destroyed by counter-bombs even as violence cannot be by counter-violence. Mankind has to get out of violence only through non-violence. Hatred can be overcome only by love. Counter-hatred only increases the surface as well as the depth of hatred.³⁸

Before nuclear weapons came into the world, Gandhi explained how this transformation will have to come from the bottom up:

We have to make truth and non-violence not matters for mere individual practice, but for practice by groups and communities and nations. That at any rate is my dream....³⁹

[Before] general disarmament ... commences ... some nation will have to dare to disarm herself and take large risks. The level of non-violence in that nation, if that event happily comes to pass, will naturally have risen so high as to command universal respect. Her judgment will be unerring, her decisions firm, her capacity for heroic self-sacrifice will be great, and she will want to live as much for other nations as for herself.⁴⁰

In his 1999 Olof Palme Memorial Lecture, then United Nations Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala (a member of the WMD Commission), recalled the 1982 Palme Report, which warned, “In their quest for security, nations must strive for objectives more ambitious than stability, the goal of the present system in which security is based on armaments.” Noting that “[m]ajor changes in this status quo will come about only from a combination of pressures *from the bottom up* in society, and from enlightened leadership at the top,” Dhanapala stressed the basic practical need for the creation of institutionalized disarmament mechanisms to “magnify” the human will that will be required to achieve disarmament. Taking the language of the nuclear weapons establishment and turning it on its head, the Under-Secretary-General said, “We have heard much in recent years about the vital importance of ‘stockpile stewardship.’ We need to encourage countries that possess nuclear arms to recognize that disarmament itself requires some ‘stewardship.’”

Dhanapala made the case for “sustainable disarmament,” which he defined as “a dynamic process—sustained by deliberate action on the part of leaders throughout the world community and from civil society—to address the combined needs of development and security through the reduction and elimination of arms.” And, he issued a challenge: “If we have indices of sustainable development, we can surely have indices of sustainable disarmament. If we have results-based budgeting in our public and private institutions, we can also have results-based disarmament.”⁴¹

Unfortunately, states’ traditional insistence on their nearly exclusive role as to military and security policy is vastly amplified with respect to nuclear weapons. The centrality of secrecy, the quasi-theological and allegedly subtle doctrines of nuclear “deterrence” and “counter-proliferation,” the technical complexity and sheer scale of the nuclear enterprise, the unimaginable power and horror of the weapons, all reinforce the nuclear weapon states’ extremely strong resistance to any significant role for the public and NGOs in setting or changing entrenched policies. Therefore, NGOs’ most important task is to articulate and promote a vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world and a program

for its achievement and to demand that the program be implemented. Given the reluctance of even the most progressive governments to assess partial or limited measures within a broader, more holistic framework, NGOs have a special responsibility to identify and make visible the economic, health and environmental, and democratic imperatives for the elimination of nuclear weapons, to mobilize public opinion, and at the same time to begin addressing the root causes of reliance on nuclear arms.

NGO advocacy for nuclear disarmament also must be linked to local, national, and international multi-issue campaigns, coalitions, and social movements promoting social justice, environmental protection, democratization, economic development, respect for human rights, conflict resolution, and comprehensive disarmament. At the same time, it is critical that NGOs recognize and remain firmly rooted in political realities while “pushing the envelope” and thereby creating openings for practical measures—sometimes referred to as an “incremental-comprehensive” approach to nuclear disarmament.⁴² To this end, NGOs in nuclear weapon and allied states have made significant contributions by researching and developing detailed, accurate information and analysis about weapons programs and policies in their own countries, and disseminating it widely to other governments and NGOs.

Most important for NGOs taking on the abolition of nuclear weapons, an issue that poses a fundamental challenge to the most powerful states, is work within national political systems. Under present conditions, in the United States this will require public education and coalition-building efforts that go well beyond traditional notions of electoral politics and legislative lobbying. More than at any time in recent history, given current geopolitical realities, those NGOs face an enormous challenge in attempting to rectify the relationship between the national and international orders.⁴³

At best, we should expect the road to abolition to be both long and difficult. Does this mean that an idea like “Abolition 2000” and the call for a time-bound framework for abolition is the wrong approach? No. For it is precisely the sense of urgency, concretely formulated, which distinguishes it from the endless vague expressions of good intentions from those who actually have every intention of keeping nuclear weapons so long as they find them useful. If we are to be successful, we have to understand the obstacles in our way. First we must identify the people and organizations who want to retain nuclear weapons, and the reasons they want them. Without significant social change, what we are likely to find is that dominant factions in the United States will continue to find nuclear weapons useful—albeit possibly “fewer but newer”—unless they are replaced by some other means of projecting overwhelming power even more effectively.

NGOs *by definition* are non-governmental organizations, meaning that they do not represent governments. It is not their role to try and cut deals with governments, or to work out the precise sequence of steps or timing on the path to abolition. Their job is to work with civil society to create the

conditions and the will necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons. Among other things, that will require a fundamental reexamination of the military-industrial-(academic) complex. In addition, a reevaluation of the typical approach in which specific weapons programs and policies are narrowly targeted and in which critiques are generally limited to technical issues (“it won’t work”) and economic issues (“it’s too expensive”) is urgently needed and long overdue. Those critiques fail to take into account the history of scientific and technological development, which shows that systems don’t need to “work” as originally intended in order to be dangerous in and of themselves, or to lead to the development of other new types of weapons. Finally, if we don’t challenge the definition of “security” that assumes that the United States has both the need and the right to deploy overwhelming force anywhere in the world within a short period of time, then the only answer to “it won’t work” is to find something that will, and the only answer to “it’s too expensive” is that national security is worth any price.⁴⁴

As historian Howard Zinn recently wrote, “When a social movement adopts the compromises of legislators, it has forgotten its role, which is to push and challenge the politicians, not to fall in meekly behind them.... Whatever politicians may do, let them first feel the full force of citizens who speak for what is right, not for what is winnable, in a shamefully timorous Congress.” Zinn concluded, “We are not politicians, but citizens. We have no office to hold on to, only our consciences, which insist on telling the truth. *That, history suggests, is the most realistic thing a citizen can do.*”⁴⁵

In his 1999 lecture, Under-Secretary-General Dhanapala stated:

We have all heard quite a bit about the ‘military-industrial-complex’... but perhaps not enough about a new player in this game, namely the diverse coalition of individuals and groups who have committed themselves to converting disarmament from a dream into a reality. If we wish to take on the ‘nuclear weapons complex’ or any other institutional bastion of support for weapons that jeopardize international peace and security, we will need to mobilize what might be called a ‘disarmament complex.’ We will need to find some enlightened leaders who can operate on the basis of sustained political and institutional support from throughout society, and who recognize that disarmament is both an efficient and an effective means to advance national security interests.

He concluded:

Continued progress in disarmament requires financial support from governments, which requires political will, which in turn ultimately derives from the people. Policies, laws, and institutions to promote the stewardship of disarmament will not appear spontaneously. They will emerge only to the extent that the people wish for them to

emerge, provide the means for such reforms, and develop the institutional architecture (the ‘disarmament complex’) needed to sustain over time and in the face of competing demands and priorities.⁴⁶

Closing the Circle

The Oxford Research Group (ORG) issued a Briefing Paper, “Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century,” about the same time as the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission released *Weapons of Terror*. ORG identified four main likely determinants of future conflicts that are likely to lead to substantial global and regional instability and large-scale loss of life: climate change; competition over resources; marginalization of the majority world; and global militarization. And it warned that unless urgent action is taken in the next five to ten years, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a highly unstable global system by the middle of the century.

The ORG report characterizes current responses to these threats as a “control paradigm”—an attempt to maintain the status quo through military means and control insecurity without addressing the root causes, and it argues that such an approach is self-defeating in the long term. As an alternative, the report offers a new approach to global security—a “sustainable security paradigm”—that does not attempt to unilaterally control threats through use of force, but rather aims to cooperatively resolve the root causes of the threat using the most effective means available. For example, a sustainable security approach prioritizes renewable (not nuclear) energy as a response to climate change; energy efficiency as a response to resource competition; poverty reduction as a means to address marginalization; *and the halting and reversal of WMD development and proliferation as a main component of checking global militarization*. Those approaches provide the best chance of averting global disaster, as well as addressing some of the root causes of terrorism.

Significantly, the ORG report recognizes the essential role of civil society and NGOs: “Governments will be unwilling to embrace these ideas without pressure from below.” And it contends that maximizing the possibilities for creating such pressure, “will mean a closer linking of peace, development and environmental issues than has so far been attempted.”⁴⁷

Few Americans—even anti-war activists—are aware that the now *universally* recognized “peace symbol” was designed in 1958 for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain. The first peace symbols, made of fired-clay, were distributed with a note explaining that in the event of a nuclear war, they would be among the few human artifacts to survive the nuclear inferno.

Saffron Walden Declaration

The Abolition 2000 Global Council, meeting in Saffron Walden England, with participants from Australia, Belgium, Egypt, France, Japan, Romania, Russia, Sweden, the UK, and the USA, reaffirms the Abolition 2000 Statement, which calls for a world free of the nuclear threat, and the Moorea Declaration, which acknowledges the abuses of colonialism and the suffering of indigenous peoples caused by the production and testing of nuclear weapons. We remember the hibakusha – the atomic bomb survivors – and call on the nations of the world to heed their urgent plea: “Before the last of us leaves this world, nuclear weapons must be abolished forever.”

We recognise that Abolition 2000 now faces a new world context because of the continuing modernisation of nuclear weapons, the US drive to weaponise and nuclearise space, and the increasing burden on the world’s resources that this immoral and illegal quest for global domination creates. The western nuclear weapons states and their allies believe they can put a “lid” on the rising tide of discontent at the economic inequity and lack of social justice among the vast majority of the earth’s people in order to maintain their access to world resources and their unsustainable levels of consumption. We assert that this dangerous and destabilising paradigm cannot endure.

We call instead for a new security framework that will serve all humanity, based on respect for international law and Treaties, conflict prevention and co-operation through a reformed United Nations. We call for immediate negotiations to abolish nuclear weapons, ban all missiles, and keep space for peace. We envisage a world that is free of nuclear weapons, free of the resultant environmental contamination, and free of social and economic injustice. We affirm our belief that this new framework is more than practical and ethical. It is imperative for our planet’s future.

Saffron Walden, May 2001

Recommendations for Society and Change

- The concept of security should be reframed at every level of society and government, with a premium on universal human and ecological security, a return to multilateralism, and a commitment to cooperative, nonviolent means of conflict resolution.

- The United States should make nuclear disarmament the leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet human and environmental needs.
- The funding community should take a longer, broader, and deeper view, and provide sustained support for alternative civil society institutions working for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of this new, life-affirming, security paradigm.