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Key Implications and Recommendations of the
Blix Commission Report for U.S. Policy on Nuclear Weapons

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The United States should:

  • Return to multilateralism and respect for international law; fulfill Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments to implement disarmament measures in conformity with principles of verification, irreversibility, and transparency; abide by the UN Charter prohibition on the threat or use of force except in self-defense against an imminent threat or as authorized by the Security Council. (Report, pp. 18, 25, 56-57, 64-65, 167-169)
  • Negotiate a verified ban on production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The Bush administration has proposed an FMCT without verification provisions. (103-105)
  • Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning all nuclear test explosions. (105-108)
  • Accompany any U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement with both countries’ commitments to an FMCT and the CTBT. (82-83)
  • Negotiate a new strategic nuclear weapons reduction agreement with Russia, cutting deployments allowed under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) by at least half, with provisions for verification and dismantlement of warheads, including those withdrawn under the SORT. (93)
  • Agree with Russia on elimination of the launch-on-warning option in nuclear war plans and a parallel decrease in operational readiness of strategic nuclear forces through measures like storing warheads separately from missiles. (90-92)
  • Declare a categorical policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, covering both pre-emptive and preventive action, and retaliation against attacks involving chemical, biological, or conventional weapons. (89-90, 92)
  • To induce Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program, offer assurances that take into account Iran’s perceptions of threats to its security and renounce regime change, and seek a freeze on production of fissile materials in the region, including by nuclear-armed Israel, as a step toward a regional zone free of WMD. (69-72)
  • To induce North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, offer similar security assurances. Seek reinstatement of the previous commitment to ban production of fissile materials by both North Korea and South Korea; make the Korean peninsula a zone free of WMD. (67-69)
  • To prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons or fissile materials, promote effective accounting and control of weapons and materials on a worldwide basis. (83-87)
  • Plan for security without nuclear weapons, and prepare for their outlawing and a nuclear disarmament treaty through practical measures undertaken with other states possessing nuclear arsenals. (108-109)